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In this paper I am concerned with the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of 
science from the perspective of philosophy. The ambition of this paper is to show that the historical 
study is an essential dimension of a sophisticated philosophical account of science. 
 
The debate on the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science took various 
forms since the 70’s. However, the idea that pursuing HPS entails the confrontation of philosophical 
accounts of science with historical data (‘confrontation model’) is persistent during all these years 
(Schickore 2011: 456). In short, there is a consensus, among many of the HPS scholars, that at least one 
way to achieve the integration between the history and the philosophy of science is to show that the 
historical case studies could lead to the refinement of the philosophical accounts of science. 
 
The aspiration of this paper is to discuss and reject two major philosophical objections that have been 
repeatedly raised against the ‘confrontation model’: a) the old Humean is/ought problem, the conviction 
that norms cannot be derived from facts (Giere 1973) and b) the so-called ‘dilemma of case studies’ (Pitt 
2001), on which historical case studies cannot serve as empirical data for the confirmation or refutation 
of the philosophical accounts. 
 
According to many HPS scholars (Giere 1973; Burian 1977; Kulka 1977; Moulines 1983; Paller 1986; 
Pinnick & Gale 2000; Shapin & Schaffer 2011) the essential difference between the history and the 
philosophy of science is that the former is an empirical or descriptive enterprise while the latter is a 
normative or prescriptive endeavor. Given this conception and given the Humean conviction that there 
is an unbridgeable philosophical gap between norms and facts, we are left with only two coherent 
philosophical options. The first is often identified with ‘historicism’ (McMullin 1974, Kuukkanen 2016) 
and rejects the idea that there exist invariant rational patterns that characterize science. The second is 
identified with ‘logicism’ (McMullin 1974) and defends the idea that philosophy can detect the 
immutable rational principles that underlie and determine the scientific progress. 
 
Historicism is a version of ‘restrictive naturalism’ (McDowell 2009) and in its radical version it takes 
normative judgements as eliminable through their reduction to empirical descriptions. Logicism, on the 
other hand, puts normative standards outside the scope of the empirical study and is, in this sense, a 
version of supernaturalism. It is often claimed (Burian & Steinle 2002, Arabatzis & Schickore 2012), even 
if not in these terms, that the ongoing divergence between the history and the philosophy of science is 
due to the fact that the historians follow the path of historicism and philosophers the path of logicism. 
In the first part of the paper, I suggest that neither radical historicism (eliminative naturalism) nor radical 
logicism (supernaturalist normativism) can sustain a proper version of the ‘confrontation model’. In the 
framework of eliminative naturalism, the normative realm is reducible to the empirical descriptions of 
the history (or every other empirical discipline) of science. There is no logical room for the autonomy of 
the philosophy and therefore there is no room for its relation to history. The ‘confrontation model’ is 
not sustainable as a model for the relation between the history and the philosophy of science, simply 
because one side of the relation (philosophy) has been collapsed to the other (history). But also in the 
framework of supernaturalist normativism, the ‘confrontation model’ is not sustainable, since the 
historical studies of the actual scientific development are simply irrelevant to the normative standards 
proposed by the philosophers. Despite their differences, logicism and historicism share the premise that 
there can be only one kind of naturalist approach to scientific evolution: the restrictive version which 
identifies the realm of nature with the subject matter of the empirical sciences. Based on this shared 
premise they end up taking opposite directions: historicism equates philosophy with the various 
empirical disciplines and discards the genuineness of its normative content while logicism makes 
empirical research irrelevant to the normative judgements in order to save the autonomy of philosophy. 
 
I argue that a proper understanding of the ‘confrontation model’ requires the rejection of both 
historicism and logicism in a philosophically coherent way. This entails two fundamental commitments: 
a) that the rejection of the abovementioned shared premise creates logical room between eliminative 
naturalism and supernaturalism. The room can be occupied by ‘liberal naturalism’ (Macarthur & DeCaro 
2010: 9) which proposes that the realm of nature is not exhaustively identified with the subject matter 
of the empirical sciences b) that the normative/descriptive dichotomy does not reflect the difference 
between the history and the philosophy of science. On the contrary, the dichotomy can be drawn only 
from within the two disciplines. These commitments can secure the autonomy of both the history and 
the philosophy of science which is a precondition for their interrelation. They can also create the 
appropriate philosophical framework for the understanding of the historical study as relevant and 
informative to the philosophical accounts of science. 
 
But how can the historical study inform the philosophical conceptualization of science? Here the second 
objection becomes relevant. According to the ‘case study dilemma’, the ‘confrontation model’ faces 
either the charge that ‘the historical evidence may have been manipulated to fit the philosophical point 
[…or…] the problem that one cannot generalize from an isolated case’ (Kinzel 2015: 54). In the second 
part of the paper, I focus on this dilemma and particularly on its first horn in order to suggest that it is 
misleading. I argue that the risk of manipulation does not exclude the possibility of counter-examples 
against the philosophical accounts of science. This very possibility can secure the relevance of the 
historical episodes to the process of the sophistication of the philosophy of science. 
 
Finally, I suggest that ‘liberal naturalism’ and the rejection of the skeptical ‘case study dilemma’ are the 
necessary preconditions for sustaining the ‘cyclical’ or ‘iteration’ model (Chang 2011; Scholl & Räz 2016; 
Hoyningen-Huene 2012) in the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. 
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